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Heimbach: Cloning Humans: Dangerous, Unjustifiable, and GenuinelyImmoral

CLONING HUMANS: DANGEROUS,
UNJUSTIFIABLE, AND GENUINELY IMMORAL
DANIEL R. HEIMBACH*

I. INTRODUCTION

When Richard Seed of Chicago announced he was assembling a team to
clone a human being, public alarm about the ethics of cloning humans ratcheted
even higher than it had risen in the wake of Ian Wilmut's success with sheep in
Scotland. The critical problem raised by cloning is the ethics of using the
procedure to clone human beings.
Mark Sauer, chief of reproductive
endocrinology at Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center in New York, stated the
issue for many when he said: "There's little question that [cloning humans] can
be done. The question is, should it be done and, if so, under what
conditions?"'
Most have reacted to the prospect of cloning humans with alarm.
Governments have either banned, or have been strongly urged to ban, the
cloning of humans, claiming it is "contrary to human dignity and thus constitutes
a misuse of biology and medicine."2 But, while a sense of alarm is shared by
many, confidence about the immorality of human cloning is not shared by all.
In her recently published book, Gina Kolata suggests that public alarm may be
greater than warranted and world leaders are in danger of overreacting. 3 While
Kolata is careful to respect moral objections, others have been less cautious. An
editorial in Business Week called readers to "embrace the biological revolution,
not cringe from it," 4 and the International Academy of Humanists has issued a
statement welcoming the prospect of human cloning and labeling opposition " the
Luddite option. "'
Ph.D. [Law, Politics, and Christian Ethics], Drew University, 1988; Professor of Christian
Ethics, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, Wake Forest, North Carolina.
1. Rick Weiss, Scientist Plans to Clone Humans; Anticipating Ban, Researcher Says He Has
Assembled Doctors, Volunteers, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1998, at A3.
2. This language was used to justify a treaty banning human cloning signed in Paris by 19
European nations on January 12, 1998. Joseph Schuman, EuropeanNations Reject Human Cloning,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Jan. 13, 1998, at A6.
3.

GINA KOLATA, CLONE: THE ROAD TO DOLLY, AND THE PATH AHEAD (1998).

4. Don't Be Afraid of Genetic Research, BUS. WK., Mar. 10, 1997, at 126.
5. Declarationin Defense of Cloning and the Integrity of Scientific Research, FREE INQUIRY,
June 22, 1997, at 11. The Luddite option "seeks to turn back the clock and limit or prohibit the
application of already existing technologies." Id. at 12.
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While opposition to human cloning has been strong in a visceral sense,
reasoned arguments supporting opposition have not been expressed nearly as
well. Indeed, Ezekiel K. Emanuel, who served as a member of the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission, noted a mismatch. After observing how the
content of testimony heard by the Commission had not seemed to match the
emotional power expressed in statements of opposition, he nonetheless went on
to say he thought a ban was warranted simply because "strong public reaction
suggests [the existence of] a strong argument."6 In other words, absent
reasoned arguments, strong feelings might be accepted to substitute. But, this
cannot be right. Feelings, apart from reasoned justification, are never adequate
to substantiate a moral position, however strong those feelings may be. If
reasoned arguments against human cloning are either not found or are not well
articulated, then feelings will be dismissed as irrelevant, and general opposition
will subside. We have to ask whether initial alarm over human cloning is
supported by anything other than feeling, and if defensible reasons do exist, we
must identify what they are.
Ruth Macklin of Albert Einstein College of Medicine has called for more
rational thinking, but in a somewhat different fashion. Macklin challenges
anyone who, like the nineteen signatories of the European Treaty, thinks a ban
prohibiting human cloning is warranted simply because it violates "human
dignity."' She observes that "dignity" is a notoriously "fuzzy concept," the
meaning of which depends on moral principles more basic than itself.8 The
term is not self-defining. Thus, unless we can say what "human dignity" is, or
unless we can identify fundamental moral norms that give it meaning, Macklin
questions how anyone can be sure it is violated by cloning. This is a fair
challenge.
In order to address the need touched by Emanuel and Macklin, this Article
will sort out and analyze the tangle of issues involved in opposing the cloning
of human life. I will argue as a Christian theologian and ethicist that opposition
is based on good reasons, reasons that can be arranged on a scale of ascending
importance. Not only does cloning human life involve enormous dangers, these
dangers are of a kind so significant that the risk is impossible to justify; and, not
only is cloning humans impossible to justify, the attempt itself is categorically
immoral.

6. KOLATA, supra note 3, at 229.
7. Id.at 20.
8. Id.
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THE DANGERS OF CLONING HUMAN LIFE

Forays into the unknown easily generate anxieties that, upon examination,
turn out to be baseless and irrational. Where such fears influence decisionmaking, they unnecessarily retard legitimate efforts to extend human knowledge
and ability beyond familiar boundaries. Fears of timidity, because they are
baseless and irrational, ought either to be quieted by rational analysis or simply
overridden by courageous determination. But not all fears are unfounded and,
where signs of obvious danger exist, reckless charges into uncharted territory
are neither intelligent nor courageous. To the contrary, failure to heed signs of
obvious danger is not only foolhardy and irresponsible, it deserves to be
condemned as culpable negligence or outright idiocy.9 Many real dangers are
associated with the prospect of cloning human life, and these dangers are not
groundless. For the purpose of evaluation, we will sort these dangers into three
categories according to the nature of risk involved: health risks, socio-political
risks, and moral risks.
A. Health Risks
One category of obvious danger is the hazard that human cloning creates
for human health and welfare. While this risk cannot be exactly measured in
advance, that such dangers exist is surely beyond doubt. By reducing diversity
in the human gene pool, cloning will weaken a natural barrier that helps protect
human bodies from attack by infectious diseases (like malaria) which constantly
mutate to find vulnerabilities in the host. As David Stipp puts it, "without sex,
we'd soon be toast for germs. " " Stipp's expression may be exaggerated, but
he identifies a serious issue. The risk to clones from mutating infectious
diseases will grow over time. That is, a group of clones will be more likely to
die out from a single disease than a comparable group of persons who possess
a more random distribution of genes. This danger is even more significant when
the corporate impact is added to the risk for individuals. Cloning will make the
entire human race more vulnerable to mutating infectious diseases, and the size
of this danger will grow exponentially in relation to the rate at which human
cloning actually reduces diversity in the gene pool for the race as a whole.
Other risks that cloning may pose to human health are raised by questions about
cell aging and increased vulnerability to the possibility of birth defects. Many
health risks, like the risk of cancer, increase with biological age. Will the genes

9. I use "idiocy" here in both the English and the underlying Greek meaning of the term. In
common English, "idiocy" is a synonym for foolishness, but the Greek word from which the English
derives refers to action that makes no objective sense because it is governed by groundless
imaginations known only to the doer.
10. David Stipp, The Real Biotech Revolution; Biotech's Real PowerLies in Reading the Book
of Life, Not Blindly Copying It, FORTUNE, Mar. 31, 1997, at 54.
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of a clone continue on the same age trajectory as genes in the body from which
they were taken? Or, will the genes of cloned cells behave in a regenerated
manner despite the age of their DNA arrangement? If genes of cloned cells do
not perform in a fully regenerated manner, a clonally generated baby may not
have long to live and could suffer degenerative conditions prematurely. Human
cloning could also increase the risk of birth defects if cloned individuals begin
marrying nearly identical genetic relatives, a danger that will be hard to avoid
in second and third generations.
Of course, it is important that we not overstate the case by exaggerating
health risks associated with human cloning. The point here is not to raise alarm,
but simply to recognize that legitimate reasons for concern do exist, and they are
not insignificant. Even if risk to human health is the only danger associated
with cloning human life, it would at least warrant delay until more can be
learned from animal research. Alone, risk to human health may not be
sufficient to warrant a permanent ban. But this is not the only danger.
B. Socio-PoliticalRisks
A second danger posed by human cloning involves risks that are social or
political in nature. These are risks having to do with misuse should human
cloning ever fall into the wrong hands. Indeed, the danger of misuse is already
well-publicized, since the idea of misused human cloning gripped the
imagination of science-fiction writers long before it ever became scientifically
possible. Crazed scientists could try to combine cloning technology with genetic
engineering to generate humanoid monsters such as Mary Shelley's
Frankenstein."
Criminals could create doppelgangers, or they could use
cloning to produce duplications of themselves so exact they would be able to
throw detectives off their trails by using cloned identities to establish a basis for
plausible deniability. 2 Dictators could try to immortalize themselves or may
try to raise an army of "terminators" with which to conquer the world. 3
Finally, social engineers with maniacal dreams could seek total authoritarian
control by using reproductive oppression and mass cloning on a scale similar to
the brave new world Aldous Huxley imagined.' 4

11. MARY W. SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (1818).
12. See, e.g., ERIC C. HIGGS, DOPPELGANGER (1987).

13. See, e.g., IRA LEVIN, THE BOYS FROM BRAZIL (1976). Levin has imagined someone with
the ability to clone multiple copies of Hitler for the purpose of resurrecting a new, more powerful
Third Reich. The novel was also the basis of a movie starring Gregory Peck and Laurence Olivier.
THE BOYS FROM BRAZIL (CBS/Fox Video 1978).
14. ALDOUS HuxLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932).
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Such dangers are not trivial just because they were first imagined by writers
of science-fiction; and, now that Ian Wilmut has proven it is possible to clone
adult mammals, they are no longer impossibly fictitious. More than any other
danger associated with cloning humans, the danger of misuse should help us
comprehend the importance of erecting reliable safeguards well before anyone
ventures into such territory. Again, more than any other danger associated with
cloning humans, the enormously negative consequences of misuse show where
the burden of proof must lie when political and legal decisions are debated
concerning the valuation of human cloning. In fact, the danger of misuse is so
large and readily comprehended that no further explanation is needed to expose
the foolishness of delaying decision on a ban. A ban is needed immediately, and
the burden of proof must be on those who think it unnecessary, not on those
satisfied with conditions already free of the dangers human cloning will
introduce.
C. Moral Risks
A third danger, less well considered but perhaps most threatening of all, is
the way cloning humans will provoke a variety of immoral consequences. I turn
here to the danger of immoral effects likely to arise even if protections are in
place to guard against the risk to human health and the danger of misuse.
Immoral consequences provoked by human cloning can be divided into four
subcategories: (1) trivialization of human worth and dignity; (2) erosion of
human freedom; (3) new opportunity for invidious discrimination; and (4)
commercialization of human life.
The first immoral consequence is the trivialization of human worth and
dignity. Such trivializing is immoral because it involves attitudes that regard
human beings as less significant, less meaningful, and therefore less worthy of
respectful treatment than they are in fact due as human beings. Human cloning,
if permitted, raises the specter of trivialized worth and dignity by diminishing
the value we recognize in individuals and perhaps confusing (at least in
perception) the meaning and significance of human selfhood. Both are pillars
of moral valuation essential to a civilized social order. 5 While some may
argue that clonal production of human life will be no more hazardous to
individuality and selfhood than the natural birth of identical twins, this issue
focuses not on twins as they presently occur but on the impact a radical rise in
the number of genetically identical persons will have on public thinking. It
arises out of the heretofore unprecedented possibility of salting the human race
with large numbers of people each genetically identical to persons who have
lived before-persons with pre-established histories, reputations, and followings.

15. K.C. Cole, In Our Own Image, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1997, at Al.
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Beyond the threat of identity confusion, human cloning will threaten to
trivialize human worth and dignity in other, more ominous ways. Many already
discuss the idea that cloning might offer parents grieving a lost child the
possibility of "replacing" that child by producing a clone from a cell obtained
from the deceased. Trivialized valuation of human life is also present in the
idea that clones could be a source of replacement body parts when age or
accident damages components of the human original. Interest in these ideas is
ominous because it demonstrates a willingness to lower moral objections against
treating human beings as means rather than ends. They reveal pressures that
toleration of human cloning will inspire, pressures that will seek policies and
laws allowing non-volitional, instrumental, and detrimental (hence immoral) use
of one segment of the race for goals or desires set by or serving the benefit of
persons other than themselves.
The second immoral consequence is the erosion of human freedom.
Cloning technology will tempt scientists and politicians to manage or shape the
human gene pool. Experts in human biology and political officials will be
attracted to the possibility of breeding for the purpose of multiplying desired
strains of human life. But the temptation to do so runs exactly contrary to, and
hence threatens, basic human freedom. 6 Even if it is never fully realized, just
having the possibility within reach will make the idea of cloning humans
"familiar." Then it will begin to look more and more "reasonable." Finally,
scientists will try to persuade politicians that cloning without their expert control
is "irresponsible," so managing the gene pool will then look very "necessary."
Real dangers will be identified and used to direct attention away from opposing
dangers caused by putting human reproduction under regulatory government
control. Should this happen, it could not take place without overriding many
moral principles, obligations, and rights that ought to be respected as
inalienable-the individual freedom and personal obligations of self-reproduction;
the sanctity and primacy of the family over the state in matters of human
reproduction; the responsibility of begetter for the begotten; and the sanctity,
independence, and privacy of reproductive decisions.
The third immoral consequence is new opportunity for invidious
discrimination. Invidious discrimination is morally offensive because it entails
the rendering of a morally significant value judgment about the worth or dignity
of another human being, or class of human beings, on grounds that do not
support moral judgment. Doing so is always wrong, and we are obligated not
only to avoid making such judgments ourselves, but also to keep clear of
16. For an early discussion of this threat, see PAUL RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN: THE ETHICS
OF GENETIC CONTROL (1970). Ramsey, referring to the loss of human freedom involved, says: "If
this design does not exceed human wisdom, it certainly falls below the morally permissible." Id.
at 74.
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circumstances that might stir others to make such judgments. Human cloning,
once permitted, will invite invidious discrimination in the form of valuing human
life by whatever genetic features are thought especially desirable.
Of course, we can imagine a society that allows human cloning while
making sure all its members refrain from judgments that value others based on
a person's clonal or sexual origin, or how many preferred genetic features one
person has compared to another. But it is likely to stay imaginary. Separating
discriminatory social pressures from acceptance of human cloning will be hard.
No, it will be impossible. Indeed, staying clear of invidious discrimination will
grow less and less likely as the number of cloned individuals grows larger. The
threat this poses was made all too real in a comment by Ruth Westheimer who,
when asked what she thought about cloning human life, said: "I came out of
Nazi Germany. If you could make people who were only Aryan, blond and
blue-eyed, someone like me-Jewish and 4-foot 7-would not be here." 7 Her
point is sobering because it is accurate. Decisions about who gets cloned might
be screened against invidious discrimination, and screening might work for a
time. But, for how long? Pressures to discriminate will tend to grow, and the
more they grow the more relentless they will become.
The fourth immoral consequence is the commercialization of human
life-any traffic of human life, in part or in whole-for the purpose of economic
gain. The immorality of this consequence is surely clear. Any traffic in human
life can only be a shameful violation of human dignity, common human decency,
the fair treatment of others, and the sanctity of human life itself.
Accommodating such interests led to the tragic institution of slavery. Yet,
barriers guarding against such odious immorality are now strained, if not already
breached, by granting patent rights to specific finds in the human genome and
by court decisions that recognize claims of ownership for the purpose of
marketing human cell lines.' 8
If our legal system already accepts commercial ownership of human cells
and creates economic rights to mere knowledge of genetic patterns that already
exist in every cell of every living human being, how will it respond to
commercial interests demanding a right to economic gain from controlling the
production of cloned humans? If our courts continue on their present course,
human cloning will raise many moral (if not yet legal) questions having to do
17. Carol M. Ostrom, Why Cloning Changes Everything, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Mar.
2, 1997, at A21.
18. For a discussion of marketing rights to human cell lines, see Moore v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). For a succinct debate on the morality of patent rights to human
life, see Ted Peters, Patenting ife: Yes, FIRST THINGS, May 1996, at 18; Richard D. Land & C.
Ben Mitchell, PatentingLife: No, FIRST THINGS, May 1996, at 20.
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with commercial interests trying to secure economic claims over human life.
Even if priority is given to an originating individual (the one from whom a
genetic code is taken), would it be moral for such a person to benefit
commercially from the marketing of his or her genetic code? Would that not
have moral parallels to the offense of producing children for a slave market?
If genetic code marketing is allowed, should originating individuals be allowed
to continue a commercial claim on their code after new clonal persons are
produced from that code? Should whole genetic codes be bought and sold to
other parties? Should human organs produced by cloning human components
be bought and sold? Such questions are odious precisely because they each to
some degree accept the idea of owning human life for the purpose of economic
gain.
They
The questions touched here are no longer purely imaginary.
anticipate reality and mark a threshold that must be addressed by any society
that has honored human dignity by opposing practices involving commercial
treatment of human life. Now that human cloning is possible, we must not
ignore the specter of slavery as it emerges in another form. In fact, the
economic possibilities are so enormous that pressures to capitalize on cloning
humans are upon us already. Richard Seed's rush for cash is only a taste of
what lies further down this path.' 9
III. UNJUSTIFIABLE RISKS
So far I have argued that human cloning will be dangerous for a range of
good reasons. But how do these dangers compare to what might be achieved by
cloning human life? Charting dangers has value, but it is not sufficient alone to
justify either action or non-action. More is required. On their own, dangers
may call us to prepare safeguards. They may call for a more vigilant and
careful attitude. They may necessitate delay. But, a catalog of dangers cannot
on its own tell us whether a ban on cloning should be thought a matter of
responsible foresight or a failure of courage. For this, we must consider the
stakes and weigh the value of human cloning as it compares to the value of what
will be risked by taking on the dangers we have charted. When this comparison
is made, we discover that all possible gains are so minimal, and the value of
what is risked so significant, that human cloning is simply impossible to justify.
It must be rejected because, aside from all else, any venture into cloning humans
is grossly imprudent.

19. John Seed, a physician in New Jersey and brother of Richard Seed, has been quoted saying
There are
of his brother's controversial venture: "He's searching for a bit of fame and glory ....
financial things too. He'd like to make a fast buck." Peter Kendall, Image of Human Cloning
Proponent: Odd and Mercurial, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1998, at 6.
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Ian Wilmut expressed this judgment at a hearing in Washington, D.C. when
he told U.S. Senators that he could see no scenario under which it would be
ethical to clone a human being."0 Kolata minimizes Wilmut's view by
observing, "Wilmut is not a professional ethicist or philosopher."2" Yet his
judgment is not wrong for that reason, nor is he alone in making it. Many
others are saying the same. Marie Antoinette Di Berardino, who has worked
on cloning frogs since the 1950s, says she cannot imagine anything that could
justify cloning a human being.22 Mark Sauer of the Columbia-Presbyterian
Medical Center in New York, when reacting to Richard Seed's plan to clone a
human being, said, "It's hard to think of a clinical scenario that's warranted
other than doing [human cloning] for the sensational value."'
So, what of Wilmut's judgment? Why should we rule out human cloning
as a matter of prudence? I have noted many serious hazards that will be caused
by cloning humans-hazards to human health, hazards that risk the future of the
human race, hazards of misuse by criminal minds, mad dictators or crazed
scientists, and hazards of immoral consequences that compromise human dignity
and freedom and erode objection to invidious discrimination and commercial
traffic in human life. How do these dangers and the value of what they put at
risk compare to what might be gained by human cloning? Are the possibilities
sufficient to make the risk "worth it"? Or, is any venture into cloning humans
more foolhardy than courageous?
Taken objectively and without exaggeration, the dangers I.have cataloged
all hazard matters of immense value and importance. At the same time, every
possible gain offered by proponents-every last one-is terribly minor by
comparison. No human being now, or ever in human history, has suffered harm
or genuine disadvantage from a lack of cloning. In fact, there is no actual need;
there are only interests. Cloning would avert no crisis (present or future), right
no wrong, remove no danger, achieve no duty, ease no hardship, and protect no
right.
This does not mean gains have not been alleged, only that the potentialities
offered in favor of cloning humans are few and unimpressive. One idea is that
cloning could be used by grieving parents to reproduce a child lost to disease or
accident. But thinking a clone actually reproduces a lost child is nothing more
than an illusion, and it is a cruel one at that. It is cruel because the illusion

20.
at 14A.
TODAY,
21.
22.
23.

Senator Christopher "Kit" Bond, Outlaw Human Cloning, USA TODAY, Mar. 18, 1997,
See also Tim Friend, Breakthrough with Sheep Could Herald Human Cloning, USA
Feb. 24, 1997, at IA.
KOLATA, supra note 3, at 228.
Id. at 36.
Weiss, supra note 1, at A3.
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(where effective) would leave parents living a lie and would interfere with their
ability to love and value their clone-child as a distinctly separate human being
who deserves to be valued and loved in his or her own right.
Another suggestion has been that cloning could add to the number of
options that might be offered to couples facing problems with infertility. But,
a range of methods already exists for helping couples limited by infertility. For
the most part, existing methods are affordable, readily available, and highly
effective for those who try them. Very few people cannot be helped by existing
methods of infertility treatment, and their lack, while sad, is not a tragedy.
Couples who desire to conceive biological children and find they are unable,
face real disappointment. Their disappointment can be profound, but only
because it is sad, not because it is tragic.
Sad though childlessness may be, no one can rightly argue that biological
reproduction is a moral right. Bearing biological children is a joy, a privilege,
and a blessing. But it is not a moral entitlement, and it is certainly not a duty
all members of the human race must fulfill artificially if natural methods fail to
function. That no such duty exists is obvious when the issue is considered from
a corporate perspective. One simply cannot say we have a duty to speed the
growth of the human race beyond the rate at which it is already advancing by
natural processes. Of course, we have a moral right to form families, and we
have a moral right within family structures to employ the natural method by
which human life is procreated. But these are rights of permission and privilege
that do not transmogrify into a right of entitlement or duty to reproduce
ourselves by anything other than natural means. Because this is true for all
methods of artificial human reproduction, it cannot apply less to the idea of
cloning as an option for the infertile. On this, Susan Jacoby has said,
If infertility is indeed a tragedy, it would be churlish to prohibit
cloning. But when infertility is viewed simply as one misfortune on
a scale of sorrows-less horrible, say, than mind-destroying diseases
or mass starvation-the ethical balance looks quite different ...
No one has the right to jeopardize the precious uniqueness of all
members of the human race in order to assuage individual heartbreak
and gratify individual desires.24
A third sort of possible gain from cloning has to do with reducing risks
related to random gene combinations arising from sexual generation. Some raise
this in terms of eliminating the uncertainty of sexual generation. Others are

24. Susan Jacoby, Entitled to the Embryo?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1993, at A19.
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attracted by the idea of avoiding the production of children who are genetically
diseased or deformed. The sort of gain offered by these potentialities is at best
ambiguous. On one hand, the uncertainty of random DNA recombinations that
result from sexual generation is valuable to human health and welfare because
it protects the race against mutating diseases. Compared to this obvious value,
simple uncertainty (not having advanced knowledge about specific gene
combinations) is only a problem of perception, and a very minor one at that.
On the other hand, cloning a carrier of some gene-based disease can be a way
to avoid having an overtly deformed child. But the result does not correct a
malady, and it only postpones the risk of overt manifestation by passing it on
intact to the next generation. Although sexual generation sometimes produces
an overtly defective child (and that certainly is tragic), where it occurs, the
genetic deficiency generally does not get passed to future generations. What
seems a benefit to individuals in one generation can over time hazard the wellbeing of the human race.
What we have considered here are potential gains that might result from
human cloning, and their value is dubious at best. What value they may entail
is terribly minor compared to what cloning puts at risk. I purposely have not
considered the merit of alleged "benefits" that are actually immoral. Among
these are possibilities that would reduce human beings to laboratory specimens,
value human beings only as a source of parts for others, take human
reproductive decisions away from individuals and assign them to experts, or
treat human life as a marketable commodity. Any possibility associated with
human cloning that runs afoul of these categories does not merit consideration
and ought not to have any weight in calculations about justifying the procedure.
This means many benefits that rightly serve to justify cloning animals-benefits
such as rapid duplication of high-volume milk cows or sheep with thicker wool,
the exploration of new breeding strategies, and more efficient production of
certain drugs-simply do not apply to evaluations concerned with the morality
of cloning humans.
As a final matter relating to comparative evaluation, we must not ignore the
way human nature affects the dangers raised by cloning human life. The ancient
Hebrew prophets knew something of human nature and cannot be faulted for
being less than clear about its compromised virtue. They told us all people are
sinners tempted like sheep to go astray, each in his own way.' We humans
are experts at self-deception, drawn by pride and sensual desire to excuse what
ought to be condemned. With this in mind, Jeremiah warned that "[t]he heart
[of man] is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked."26 Every

25. Isaiah 53:6.
26. Jeremiah 17:9 (King James).
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member of the human race-not just those who accept the Hebrew
Scriptures-after honest self-reflection and examination of human experience,
must arrive at the same or nearly the same conclusion.
When human nature is included in calculations touching justification, the
most critical aspect relevant to cloning humans lies in the way it affects options
for political regulation. Should human cloning ever be allowed, only two
possibilities for political regulation exist, and neither is attractive. One option
is the free market approach that would allow volitional, yet foolish, "consumer
eugenics." The other option is politically controlled social engineering featuring
non-volitional and supremely perilous "elitist eugenics." Lest any be tempted,
no one should think there is hope in combining these approaches, for doing so
can only produce a combination of distasteful aspects (a little foolishness with
a little peril) while failing to eliminate any. A combined approach will also
bring new crises produced at their intersection.27
Should political regulation of human cloning take a free market approach,
what sort of choices would people make? Whom would people most desire to
clone? A realistic assessment of human nature as reflected in movements of
popular sentiment can only mean that free market cloning will produce many
more Madonnas than Mother Teresas, many more Donald Trumps than Billy
Grahams, many more Michael Jacksons than Colin Powells, and many more
Arnold Schwarzeneggers than George Washingtons. Combine with this the fact
that cloning will always have more attraction for self-admiring egomaniacs than
for the selfless and unpretentious, and it becomes clear that free market cloning
will quickly spell disaster for our race. On this, Richard McCormick of the
University of Notre Dame observes: "The very person who says I want a lot of
me's out there is the very person you wouldn't want to be cloned."28
But, if free market cloning spells disaster, what is the alternative? There
is only one, that being some form of control by an elite who either represents,
or is backed by, the state. The decisions that controllers make about
cloning-decisions about who, when, why, and how many-will have a shaping
effect on future generations. To make these decisions, they will need goals.
What features should be emphasized? What specimens of humanity are so
exceptional as to qualify for repetition by cloning? Who must be rejected and
for what reasons? No doubt all decisions will be "well intended," and they will
be based on the "best" available information. These will be judgments of value,
but their impact will not be volitional with respect to those most affected by

27. For example, there would be no end to questions such as: who will be privileged to take
a consumer approach, who will be restrained by the social engineers, and who will have a say in
deciding?
28. Carol M. Ostrom, The Ethcis of Cloning Ourselves, SEATrLETIMES, Feb. 25, 1997, at Al.
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their decisions-the vast body of individual men and women who constitute rank
and file members of the human race. In short, a controlled social engineering
approach to human cloning is unavoidably both eugenic and elitist, a
combination the horrors of which were vividly etched by Aldous Huxley in his
1932 best-seller, Brave New World.
In Huxley's book, the horror of government controlled human cloning is
all well intended and justified in the minds of those in control of the operation:
[O]ne of the students was fool enough to ask where the advantage
lay.

"My good boy!" The Director wheeled sharply round on him.
"Can't you see? Can't you see?" . . . "[Cloning] is one of the major
instruments of social stability!"
Standard men and women; in uniform batches.29
Here is a statement of non-malicious good intention-the assurance of social
stability without "mistakes." Is this not good? Why should elite control of
human cloning, backed by government, and for "magnanimous" purposes, be
so horrific? It is horrific, not because it lacks good intention in the minds of
those in control, but because it is oppressive, because it is totalitarian, and
because it imposes an ideal selected by a few who in dignity and worth rank
equal (and no more than equal) with those over whom they exercise control.
Otherwise stated, the prospect is horrific because it violates human freedom in
a way that reduces human beings to the level of animals. It is horrific because
it fails to respect each man as an end in himself-as a center of personal dignity
equal in worth to every other.'
The case for freedom that sets human reproduction apart from animal
breeding is maintained only by defending the fact that human dignity and worth
rise above utilitarian regard for the bodies we inhabit because the dignity and
worth of human life both inhere in something Christians know as the Imago
Dei-the reflection each individual human being equally bears of our
transcendent Creator. 3 It is precisely because human dignity rises above the
utilitarian and mundane, and because it does so equally for each, that any merely
utilitarian or mundane treatment, and any unequal valuation of human life, is

29. HUXLEY, supra note 14, at 6.
30. This parallels part of Ramsey's case against human cloning. Cf. Paul Ramsey, Moral and
Religious Implications of Genetic Control, in GENErICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN 107-69 (John D.
Roslansky ed., 1966).
31. For a more in depth development of this point, see R. Albert Mohler, Jr., The Brave New
World of Cloning:A Christian Worldview Perspective,in HUMAN CLONING: RELIGIOUS RESPONSES
91-105 (Ronald Cole-Turner ed., 1997).
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rightly abhorred. Moreover, the horror of such treatment is not reduced by
biological age or the physical condition of our bodies.
In this Section, I have argued not only that dangers are raised by human
cloning, but that engaging these dangers cannot be justified. When the value or
significance of what might be gained is compared to what must be risked, there
simply is no comparison. The venture is "not worth it." Not only is a venture
into cloning humans unjustified under present circumstances, it will never be
justified, and the permanence of this conclusion is established most clearly when
human nature is matched with options for social regulation. Human cloning is
not only unjustified, it is unjustifiable.
If categorical certainty seems strange, we have only to note that our
judgment here does not wait on what scientists might learn about cloning in the
future. Rather, it depends entirely on what we know, or should know, about
ourselves already. The sort of knowledge upon which the certainty of our
judgment rests has to do with aspects of human self-awareness that no
accumulation of biological information or advancement in technology can
possibly alter. It has to do with the indelible streak of perversity that lies in
every human heart. When this is taken into account, any venture into cloning
humans must be judged forever foolhardy and never heroic.
IV. HUMAN

CLONING-A GENUINELY IMMORAL EFFORT

But, not only should we judge human cloning to be dangerous, and not only
ought we to conclude it is unjustifiable. The effort itself is immoral. This final
claim takes us to the most profound level of moral analysis. It says that cloning
humans is itself a morally wrong thing to do. The actions and intentions
involved in cloning human life (however they may be safeguarded, and however
the relative merits are weighed) are themselves inherently and unalterably
immoral. While proving this may seem difficult, the arguments to which we
now turn provide the strongest reasons of all for opposing human cloning. A
convincing case can be made, and is made in three ways. Human cloning
involves immoral processes, the action is itself inherently immoral, and it is
driven by immoral desires.
A. Human Cloning Involves Immoral Processes
What is required to clone mammalian life successfully involves processes
that must be judged immoral if applied to human beings. Two techniques have
been developed: cloning by "twin fission" caused by splitting blastomeres, and
cloning by nuclear transfer from the cell of an adult into the casing of an egg
cell. The first technique produces individuals who are both genetically identical
and the same age. Thus, they are the same as natural twins except that their
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division was intended and artificially achieved. The second technique produces
an individual genetically identical to a pre-existing other, one already born and
separated in age by an indefinite length of time.
Of these cloning procedures, the first, because it parallels the formation of
natural twins, might seem less problematic than the second. But, applied to
human life, we still have cause for moral objection. Some may be concerned
about its artificiality, and these to be consistent must not only oppose cloning but
must also oppose all other methods by which it is now possible to conceive
human life under artificial conditions. However this may be, the most telling
moral objection to cloning human life by "twin fission" is that it hazards
innocent human life without moral justification (such as saving the life of
another). Indeed, it does so without any intention of good in favor of the one
whose life is endangered by the procedure. Anticipating this issue a generation
ago, Paul Ramsey explained the reason for moral objection in a manner that
cannot be said more clearly, three decades later, now that the possibility of
cloning humans is actually upon us:
Because we ought not to choose for a child-whose procreation
we are contemplating-the injury he may bear, there is no way by
which we can morally get to know whether many things now planned
are technically feasible or not. We need not ask whether we should
clone a man or not . . . . since we can begin to perfect these
techniques in no other way than by subjecting another human being to
risks to which he cannot consent as our coadventurer in
promotingmedical or scientific "progress." The putative volition of
the child we are trying to learn how to manufacture must, anyway, be
said to be negative.32
The second cloning procedure, while unobjectionable if limited to animals,
must not only be judged immoral for use on humans but, in this connection,
raises moral objection at a higher level than the first. While the first cannot be
done without unjustified hazard to innocent human life, the second cannot be
done without sacrificing it. Cloning by nuclear transfer would not, of course,
hazard innocent human life in the process of extracting nuclei from differentiated
cells and fusing them into the casings of egg cells. This could not occur
because, until the transfer process is complete, the parts of cells involved are
only parts, not selves. Although living, these cells and parts of cells are not
distinctly new and separate human beings. It is what happens after fusion is
complete that causes serious moral objection to the prospect of cloning human
life by nuclear transfer.

32. RAMSEY, supra note 16, at 134.
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Working to clone sheep, scientists at the Roslin Institute produced 277 new
sheep lives before a single one survived to a healthy birth. Moreover, these
researchers did so reserving-as humans working with animals-moral authority
to destroy embryos that seemed defective, useless, or in some other way
undesirable. Because human life is sacred in a way animal life is not, or at least
because researchers would be handling human life with inherent worth and
dignity equal and not subordinate to their own, any treatment of human life
approaching what was done to clone sheep must be judged grossly immoral.
Speaking to a secular audience, Arthur Caplan, director of the Center for
Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania, summarized the immorality of
cloning human life by nuclear transfer, saying, "To do this [cloning sheep] they
killed 300 [sic] embryos and made deformed sheep... That would make doing
anything in humans beyond unethical-it would be criminal.""
Theological analysis, which ascribes transcendent worth to each human
individual because no one is his own creation and because every member of the
human race derives inherent and equal value from God our Creator, certainly
will not lessen the force of Caplan's objection. If any distinction needs to be
made, then theological concerns call us to object more strongly still.
Theologically, the most significant reason for moral objection transcends mere
species loyalty, and even transcends a self-interested awe for life itself. Rather,
it depends directly on reverence for God and derived reverence for the worth
and dignity of the one being in all creation set apart by God to bear his image.
B. The Action Is Itself Inherently Immoral
I have argued that human cloning is unalterably immoral because it involves
immoral processes. But this is not the only way to argue the immorality of
cloning humans. Still more important (at least in matters of moral argument)
is the fact that cloning human life in any manner, under any circumstance, and
for any reason is itself an inherently immoral act. No one can possibly deny
that cloning alters the fundamental nature of human reproduction. Because it
does so and does so unavoidably, the cloning of human life cannot but affect
negatively (i.e., for evil) all institutions and qualities of human existence that
hedge and define the morality of this critically important dimension of
life-marriage, parenthood, family, sex (both love-making and life-giving),
human sexuality, and even the continued existence of the human race as given.
In connection with these institutions and qualities, any act of human cloning is
inherently immoral and must be judged immoral for at least seven reasons: (1)
it is an act of species suicide; (2) it violates the moral institution of parenthood;
(3) it violates the moral institution of marriage; (4) it denies and violates the
33. Ostrom, supra note 28, at Al.
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moral meaning of procreating children; (5) it rejects the moral meaning and
significance of human sexuality; (6) it de-humanizes human reproduction by
severing it from life-giving love; and (7) it misappropriates ownership of the
design rights to human life.
1. Cloning Is an Act of Species Suicide
First, human cloning is inherently immoral because it is an act of species
suicide. The issue here is not that cloning humans, once allowed, will
immediately cause the human race to cease existing. Nor does it mean that
cloning will in the end terminate all succession of human life. At issue is the
fact that, however gradual, the self-modifying effect of cloning must inevitably
produce changes so radical that their accumulation can only be classified as
species suicide. This concern was argued by Ramsey who explained that
terminating life succession is not the only form of species suicide. Replacement
of a species "by a species of life deemed more desirable" falls in the same
moral category because it entails "the inner motive and action of any
suicide. "' What clonal self-production would produce over time cannot be the
human race we have. At least, it cannot be the sort of human race we have
been from creation (or however inception of our race is conceived) until now.
Rather, it would be a biologically modified successor to our race, a differently
made-up human race-different, not just in time, size, and individual
membership, but different in biological constitution.
Because clonal
reproduction directs the human race toward species replacement, the clonal
reproduction of human beings is a form of species suicide, and, because it is a
form of suicide, it is immoral for all the reasons that render any act of selfmurder immoral.
For Christians, any intentional effort to terminate innocent human life is a
violation of God's Sixth Commandment: "You shall not murder."'
This
moral prohibition protects the sanctity of human life, and while it is limited to
murder, it is broad as to time and circumstance. It invalidates the morality of
any action meant to end human life apart from culpability. Species suicide of
the form that terminates the human race by self-modification may not end the
process of life-succession. Yet it is, as to its nature, an act of suicidal murder
nonetheless, for it seeks to replace our species with something else. Human
cloning is inherently immoral because, however done, the act itself violates the
sanctity of human life apart from any notion of culpability.

34. RAMSEY, supra note 16, at 152.
35. Exodus 20:13 (NIV).
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2. Cloning Violates the Moral Institution of Parenthood
Second, human cloning is inherently immoral because it violates the moral
institution of parenthood. Cloning is by definition a process that produces life
without parents. Whatever else is said, it is obvious that human cloning is an
act the nature of which severs generation of human life from the moral
institution of parenthood. Because human cloning takes the production of human
life outside the institution of parenthood, the nature of the act itself rejects the
moral institution of parenthood and is hence immoral. No intention to the
contrary will undo the fundamentally immoral nature of this rejection. Neither
will it be changed by assigning cloned children (as we surely hope they would)
to adults charged with the legal rights and moral responsibilities of "parents."
Nor would it be altered by raising clones alongside procreated children in
families that are otherwise normally constituted.
Theologically, this aspect means that clonal production of human beings,
whatever the circumstances, is a violation of the sanctity of parenthood. In the
Fifth Commandment (the only commandment that comes with a promise of
blessing), God mandates the honoring of parents and parenthood: "Honor your
father and your mother, so that you may live long . . . . " However it is
safeguarded, clonal production of human life violates the Fifth Commandment.
By severing the generation of human life from parenthood, it necessarily
dishonors the moral (sacred) institution of parenthood even if it never dishonors
any specific individual or pair of individuals engaged in parenting
responsibilities.
3. Cloning Violates the Moral Institution of Marriage
Third, human cloning is inherently immoral because it violates the moral
institution of marriage. Morally speaking, marriage is more than a civil
institution. It is more than an economic institution. It is even more than a
social institution. It is all these to be sure. But marriage is most deeply and
essentially a moral institution that binds a man and a woman in a covenant
relationship, the meaning of which rises above the significance of their
individuality, above the dimension of mere sentiment and emotion, and above
what is subject to nothing but the arbitrary choices of autonomous individuals.
In other words, the meaning and significance of marriage is more than utilitarian
(either corporate or individual) because it is a deeply human institution, and
what is essentially human always transcends utilitarian calculation. Human
cloning is inherently immoral because it both trivializes and violates the
covenantal nature of marriage as a moral institution.

36. Exodus 20:12 (NIV).
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It trivializes the significance of marriage by making the institution irrelevant
to the generation of human life-not only as to honor and respect, but also as
to relevance. Cloning is an act the nature of which makes commitment to any
sort of on-going family relationship between adults unnecessary. It requires no
fidelity to a spouse because no spouse is anywhere included in the process by
which clonal-life is generated. Indeed, cloning takes production of human life
entirely outside the realm of meaning within which fidelity in relationships of
sexual generation has any application. To the degree that the moral concept of
fidelity has any meaningful connection with the non-sexual clonal production of
human life, it is entirely limited to self and the degree to which the generating
self may respect obligations to what the generating self has cloned. But not only
does cloning trivialize the moral significance of marriage, it also of necessity
violates the moral boundaries of the marriage institution. This means cloning
human life is also immoral because it is adulterous. Adultery is immoral
because it violates the moral integrity of marriage and does so on two levels.
Any adulterous action not only violates a particular marital relationship, it also
violates the moral meaning (or sanctity) of marriage as a moral institution.
For Christians, adultery is clearly prohibited by the Seventh Commandment
where without equivocation or qualification, God requires total fidelity in
marriage: "You shall not commit adultery. "' Human cloning does not simply
threaten marriage by making it trivial; the act itself is essentially and
unavoidably adulterous because it takes generation of human life outside
marriage altogether. No spouse either present or future is part of the act. He
or she may consent. He or she may desire, plan, or even arrange the cloning
process. But these elements, if present, do not alter the biological reality. In
whatever sense a marriage partner may be legally or morally bound to an
originator of clonal life, that partner is certifiably not part of the life-generating
act itself. He or she is not needed. If present at all, the spouse of a clonal
originator is no more than an observer. Because cloning human life takes lifegiving outside the institution of marriage, it is adulterous, and because it is
adulterous, it is unalterably and unavoidably immoral.
4. Cloning Denies and Violates the Moral Meaning of Procreating Children
Fourth, human cloning is inherently immoral because it denies and violates
the moral meaning of procreating children.38 Cooperative participation in the
37. Exodus 20:14 (NIV).
38. Gilbert Meilaender made this the focus of his presentation to the National Bioethics
Advisory Commission on March 13, 1997. Gilbert Meilaender, Remarks on Human Cloning to the
Natural Bioethics Advisory Commission, BIOLAW, June 1997, at 114-17. See also Gilbert
Meilaender, Cloning in ProtestantPerspective,32 VAL. U. L. REv. 707 (1998); Gilbert Meilaender,
Religious-Based Perspectives on Cloning of Humans I: Protestantism (visited Apr. 21, 1998)
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wonder of begetting life that is of-us-but-not-us is replaced by a production
process that, not only is artificial, but actually severs life-giving from sexual
union. Cloning changes children into products of technology and leaves sexual
union little more than entertainment. Clonal children, albeit human, will be
children set apart from the rest of us by identities shaped by the fact that they
were generated by non-sexual, impersonal means. They will be fabrications of
human design crafted to suit goals preselected by genetic artisans. No longer
gifts of procreation each with a natural mother and father from whom their
being originates in relational union, clonal production turns children into
laboratory specimens who owe their physical origin and biological construction
to technicians and scientists, not parents. Human cloning is inherently immoral
because it touches the meaning of children and does so in a way that is morally
and philosophically (if not also biologically) contrary to the good of anyone who
begins life as a human craft project-the result of bio-technology and human
design rather than welcomed as the offspring of human parents.
But not only is cloning immoral because it will make children (at least
clonal children) into products, cloning humans is inherently immoral because the
flip side of commodification (making children into products) is rejection of at
least half the moral meaning-the procreational significance-of sexual
intercourse. Cloning denies the goodness of life-giving sex. Theologically, this
means cloning applied to human life runs contrary to the sanctity of human
sexual union. In Scripture, God not only assigns the first man and woman the
responsibility of stewardship over the rest of creation, he also pronounces
blessing-a statement of moral meaning and value-upon the procreation of
human life through sexual union.39 Acts of human cloning, should they occur,
must inevitably be statements of preference having moral as well as biological
significance. By circumventing procreational sexual union, cloning is inherently
immoral because it is, however intended by those who pursue it, an act of
preference that rejects the moral goodness of procreational sexual union in favor
of something else. It is immoral because it rejects the moral goodness of
enjoying God's blessing, God's way.
5. Cloning Rejects the Moral Meaning and Significance of Human Sexuality
Fifth, human cloning is inherently immoral because it rejects the moral
meaning and significance of human sexuality.
Ursula Goodenough of
Washington University in St. Louis joked that with cloning, "there'd be no need

<http:www.all.org/nbac/970313a.htm>. Meilaender's discussion picks up on points elaborated
earlier by Oliver O'Donovan. See OLIVER O'DONOVAN, BEGOTTEN OR MADE? (1984).
39. Genesis 1:28.
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Then, Lisa Cahill of Boston College, when addressing the
for men."'
National Bioethics Advisory Commission, mentioned the same idea and admitted
it was attractive to her feminist instincts. 4' But, what these women meant in
jest should not be dismissed lightly. Indeed, it signals a matter of great
significance.
Human cloning not only circumvents procreational sexual union, it
challenges the moral meaning of human sexuality per se. It not only violates the
sanctity of sex (a matter of human conduct), it also rejects the deeply moral and
sacred significance of human sexuality (a matter of human identity). The act of
cloning human life is opposed to sexual being, a feature at the core of human
design and purpose, a feature the moral significance of which transcends
biological function, a feature that separates all human beings into male or
female. Because human sexuality is morally (not just biologically) good, and
because the moral good of human sexuality is not only a good of moral
permission (simply OK) but is also a moral ideal (a goal we ought to pursue),
any act that opposes the goodness of human sexuality is not morally neutral. It
has to be immoral. Human cloning opposes the moral goodness of human
sexuality and is inherently immoral for that reason.
One could respond that cloning still requires gestation and so does not
completely eliminate all need for the female side of human sexuality. But the
idea of clonal generation does not rest at opposing the goodness of male
sexuality while preserving a still necessary role for female sexuality. Cloning
opposes female sexuality as well, but does so in a fashion that is temporally
limited and only to a slightly less degree. Gestation after all is not integral to
what cloning is about. Human wombs will also be eliminated when alternatives
(either animal or artificial) become available. If or when that happens, cloning
will render female sexuality every bit as insignificant as male sexuality would
be made at the start.
While the moral value of human sexuality should be obvious to everyone,
Christians understand that human sexuality (not just sexual function) is sacred
in a way that does not apply to animals. That is, human sexuality is something
given-a gift of God-the meaning of which is connected not only to his design
for human life, but to his purposes for it as well. God's design is not

40. With Cloning of a Sheep, Ethical Ground Shifts, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Feb. 24,
1997, at Al.
41. Lisa Sowle Cahill, Hearings on Cloning: Religion-BasedPerspectives, BIOLAW, June 1997,
at 100-03; see also Lisa Cahill, Religion-Based Perspectives on Cloning of Humans I: Roman
Catholicism (visited Apr. 21, 1998) <http:www.all.org/nbac/970313a.htm> (testimony presented
before the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Washington, D.C., Mar. 13, 1997).
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arbitrary-it is intentional: "male and female he created them." 42 And this
intentionality was demonstrated by distinctly separate acts of creation that
together, yet distinct, gave unique significance to human sexual identity and
placed it above the merely biological significance of animal sexuality.
Moreover, it was through acceptance, celebration, and responsible use of sexual
being that the human race (male and female) was ordered to realize the morally
good purposes of becoming "fruitful" (life-giving), 43 and fully "united" (lovemaking)-a dimension of relational unity involving every level of being." All
this, God pronounced, not just "good," but "very good."4" By contrast,
human cloning denies the goodness of human sexuality to its core and issues a
statement (intended or not) that directly contradicts the divine pronouncement.
6. Cloning De-humanizes Human Reproduction by Severing It from
Life-giving Love
Sixth, human cloning is inherently immoral because it de-humanizes human
reproduction by severing it from life-giving love. Clonal production may
generate life and that life may be fully human. But however human it may be,
a clone will be someone produced by an act of laboratory fabrication-an act of
technical skill-not by an act of love expressed in self-releasing, self-giving
union. Clonal production is inherently rion-relational, and because it is nonrelational, it is also impersonal. What cloning does may result in personal
being, but it will be a person whose coming-to-be is not the fruit of love.
Human life-giving must be relational and personal, or it is de-humanizing, and
what is de-humanizing (what violates the personal value and significance of
human life) is immoral. Because human cloning is life-giving without love, and
because life-giving without love is immoral, human cloning must be immoral.
Christianity, along with most other religious traditions, teaches the moral
importance of neighbor-love and abhors the immorality of selfishness because
it places satisfaction of self over and against the good of others. Jesus taught
that we should each love our neighbors as ourselves,' and clonal selfreproduction falls short of this mark. That is, human cloning does not love the
neighbor. At least it does not love the nearest other involved in the act of
generation-the clone. Instead, it severs love-making from life-giving and, in
the place of love-making, joins life-giving to inordinate self-love (self-love that
goes beyond what it ought to the detriment of others). It is in fact profoundly
ironic that cloning humans is not, and can never be, an act of self-giving

42. Genesis 1:27 (NIV).
43. Genesis 1:28.
44. Genesis 2:24 (NIV).

45. Genesis 1:31.
46. C. Matthew 22:39.
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(selfless, other regarding) love even though it is an act of biological selfrepetition. The act fails self-giving love because cloning (biological selfrepetition) is neither other-regarding nor selfless. By severing love-making from
life-giving, human cloning can and will only be an act of unadulterated
selfishness.
7. Cloning Misappropriates Ownership of the Design Rights to Human Life
Seventh, human cloning is inherently immoral because it misappropriates
ownership of the design rights to human life. It is larcenous because an act of
clonal generation of human life presumes ownership of something to which no
human being can rightly claim title-the design and purpose of human life itself.
In other words, cloning humans violates humanity (a quality we all share) by
misappropriating an owner's right to reshape and so redefine "humanity." At
the very least, we should argue that no individual (be he scientist, politician, or
Supreme Court Justice), and no elite group of human beings (be it legislature,
court, panel, committee, or commission), has any more title to the design of
human life than any other member of the race. Whatever our position,
education, or intent, each of us shares equally in humanity. Each of us has an
equal stake in the moral significance of the design and purpose of human life.
For this reason, it must always be immoral for any stake holder to touch the
design of human life apart from the unanimous support of all other stake
holders. Of course, given the size of the human race, any hope of obtaining
such support is actually impossible.
But theological concerns that make human cloning larcenous go farther than
equal participation by every man, woman, and child in the general design and
purpose of human life. Theologically, human cloning is larcenous because it
claims an ownership right to the image of God, when in fact that image remains
God's, not ours, even though it is carried by each member of the human
race. 47 Thus, to the degree human cloning misappropriates the Imago Dei, it
is contrary to the Eighth Commandment: "You shall not steal." 48
Misappropriating the Creator's ownership title remains an issue even though the
image of God in man goes beyond the physical. It is true that our bodies are
not all we are. But, it is also true that we are not what we are as humans apart

47. Genesis 1:27.
48. Exodus 20:15 (NIV).
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from embodiment. Furthermore, the immorality involved is not affected by
whether or not cloning humans can ever actually change the Imago Dei in
anyone (I think it cannot). Just manipulating, or attempting to manipulate, the
design and purpose of human life is sufficient to render cloning humans a matter
of misappropriation, for it is either "attempted robbery," or it is tampering with
a design we have no authority to change.
Just as the owner of a car is offended by a valet who uses it for a taxi after
the car is entrusted to his care, or just as a patent owner's title is violated when
another attempts to use it for the purpose of design modification, so cloning
human life touches the image of God in man in a manner that fails to honor
proper ownership. In as much as humanity is uniquely dignified, having been
set above all other forms of created life because we alone are privileged to bear
the image of God, the final reason cloning humans (the act itself) is inherently
immoral is because the design and purpose of human life is not, never has been,
and never will be, ours to change.
C. Cloning Is Driven by Immoral Desires
At the most profound level of moral analysis, which is to say the
theological level, 49 there remains at least one more way to argue that human
cloning is unalterably immoral. Arguments in this category should not be
treated less seriously in a pluralistic context just because they are theological.
Rather, these issues are relevant to a pluralistic society if only because failure
to treat them seriously will tend to undermine general respect as civil
government (secular, pluralistic, or otherwise) passes laws, makes policies, or
sets standards contrary to moral convictions that frame life and thought for large
portions of the population.
To those who follow the moral tradition of the Hebrew Scriptures and who
find in them the moral authority of God, cloning human life must be immoral
not only because it involves immoral processes, and not only because the nature
of the act is inherently immoral, but also because it is driven by and in turn
provokes three kinds of immoral desire-the desire to reach immortality on our
own terms without God, the desire to preempt God by assuming his place, and

49. Whether acknowledged explicitly or not, every frame of moral analysis depends on
presuppositional starting points or commitments of faith that set, coordinate, and justify particular
judgments of moral value. Because moral thinking cannot begin without such starting points, there
is no system of moral analysis that is not at least phenomenologically religious, nor can moral
judgments be made that are religiously neutral. When it comes to moral evaluation and judgment,
the most one can do in a pluralistic culture is hope for reasoned persuasion and fairness.
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the desire to worship human beings (either self or another) in the place of
God. 0 This is not the place for lengthy exposition, but a quick review of each
is in order.
For many, though not all, one of the great attractions of clonal reproduction
is that it looks like a step in the direction of human immortality-an immortality
that if successful could be controlled entirely on our own terms. Although a
clone will always be temporally and positionally other than the generational self,
the nature of its being (to say nothing of its physical appearance) promises to be
so nearly the same as its generational self as to invite self-delusion in the minds
of those tempted to clone themselves. Yet, delusions aside, cloning also
suggests the future possibility of generating perfectly compatible replacement
parts, which carried far enough will tempt some to pursue immortality by
perpetual replacement. According to Scripture, it is not wrong for humans to
desire immortality, but it is profoundly wrong to seek immortality on our own
terms apart from God. Mortality entered the world when our first parents
disobeyed God,"' and they were banned from Eden lest they reach out their
hands "and take also from the tree of life and eat, and live forever."2 God
has promised eternal life, 3 but only on his terms; and, he plans to restore
access to the tree of life, but only when his agenda for human history is
complete.5
A second attraction that drives interest in human cloning is the idea that
through cloning the human race could start to control its own evolution. It
provokes the question: "Why should we be satisfied with staying mere
progenitors, when we can become the creators of future humanity?" This desire
to be creators of our race can easily masquerade as a perfectly legitimate thirst
for greater knowledge and ability. But what sort of ability is in view? Why
should anyone aspire to take charge of human evolution? What gives the
temptation real power is the prospect it offers for taking over the role of Creator
for the future of our race. It is the prospect of playing God, preempting God,
or becoming God for ourselves. For those who revere Scripture, such desire
repeats the original temptation: "you will be like God."' And, to all who in
pride or delusions of selfish-grandeur aspire to deity in their own right, the God
50. Inordinate desire is what makes reading pornographic literature immoral even apart from
any overt action to satisfy the desires it provokes. Jesus taught that wrong desire apart from
outward conduct is sufficient to make one guilty of violating God's moral law against adultery.
Matthew 5:27-28.
51. Genesis 2:17; 3:3; and 3:19.
52. Genesis 3:22 (NIV).
53. John 3:16.
54. Revelation 22:2.
55. Genesis 3:5 (NIV).
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that "you will die like mere men; you will fall like every
of Scripture 5warns
6
other ruler."
A third desire lurking behind the attraction of cloning ourselves, a desire
that for many is or will be provoked (even aggravated) by the prospect of clonal
self-repetition, is the idolatrous worship of self, either in ourselves or in other
human selves. One is the idolatrous vanity of self-worship. The other is the
vain idolization of another human like ourselves. The first arises when one is
tempted to think: "I'm so grand; there should be a lot more me's around." The
same temptation would be provoked by competition when others are tempted to
ask: "Why should there be more of him or her than of me?" The second sort
arises in thinking: "I want for myself a copy of that celebrity" or "a repeat of
that particular child." Of course, genuine love of others is not immoral. But
the moral becomes immoral when natural affection escalates into worship, and
love becomes worship when devotion requires the devotee to sacrifice others,
or when valuation of a loved one (or thing) is set above all other values in the
life of the devotee (i.e., is made a god). Devotion of this sort is immoral
because it makes a god of a thing or being who is not God. In the Hebrew
Scriptures, distorted devotion violates God's first two commandments: "You
shall have no other gods before me,"" and "You shall not make for yourself
an idol in the form of anything in heaven above or on the earth beneath or in the
waters below. "58
V. CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have argued that human cloning involves enormous
dangers and these dangers involve risks so significant that human cloning can
never be justified. Furthermore, I have argued, not only is cloning humans
unjustifiable, but the attempt is categorically immoral because it requires
unavoidably immoral processes, the act of cloning humans is itself inherently
immoral, and it is driven by or must provoke immoral desires. In framing these
arguments, I have relied on different reasons, many of which are practical or
generally philosophical in nature. But I have also discussed reasons for
opposing human cloning that are unapologetically theological and Christian.
That is, they require a particular set of religious beliefs.
Arguments based on practical and generally philosophical reasons are, on
their own, more than adequate to warrant banning the clonal production of
humans, and to do so on a permanent basis. Any society, government, or court
of law-however independent of particular religious authorities-ought to oppose

56. Psalm 82:7 (NIV).
57. Exodus 20:3 (NIV).
58. Exodus 20:4 (NIV).
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human cloning out of sober and realistic experience with human nature, out of
respect for human dignity, and in order to affirm, protect, and uphold the
integrity of essential human institutions such as marriage, parenthood, and
childhood. Should these not be enough, a secular government ought to be
persuaded by appeals made on the basis of its duty to ensure species survival
and its obligation to safeguard the goodness of human sexuality and sexual
procreation.
But, because all moral reasoning arises out of religious conviction (whether
consciously or unconsciously), and because no moral analysis is possible that
does not first begin with convictions of faith, the most profound level of moral
reasoning will always be theological. When momentous moral issues are at
stake, consideration of religious convictions underlying moral analysis (on all
sides) not only is appropriate, but is in fact needed for clarity, wisdom, and
fairness. However persuasive practical and generally philosophical reasons for
banning human cloning may be, the most persuasive (because most important)
are those that come from the theological level of moral analysis. Thus, all else
aside, human cloning should be banned simply because we ought to join Paul
Ramsey who warned against cloning humans because "[mian cannot endure if
there is no creation beneath him, assumed in his being, on which he ought not
to lay his indefinitely tampering hands."" We should also heed the warning
Jesus gave about staying clear of inordinate aspirations: "What good will it be
for a man if he gains the whole world, yet forfeits his soul? " '

59. RAMSEY, supra note 16, at 125.
60. Matthew 16:26 (NIV). The Greek text can just as well be translated to focus on collective
rather than individual human identity. (Hence: "What good will it be for the human race if it gains
the whole world, but . . "). Jesus did not exclude either rendering.
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